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Abstract
We study the mechanism by which unconventional (balance-sheet) mon-
etary policy can rule out self-fulfilling sovereign default in a model with
optimizing but discretionary fiscal and monetary policymakers. By pur-
chasing sovereign debt, the central bank e§ectively swaps risky government
paper for monetary liabilities only exposed to inflation risk, thus yielding
a lower interest rate. We characterize a critical threshold for central bank
purchases beyond which, absent fundamental fiscal stress, the government
strictly prefers primary surplus adjustment to default. Since default may
still occur for fundamental reasons, however, the central bank faces the risk
of losses on sovereign debt holdings, which may generate ine¢cient inflation.
This risk does not undermine the credibility of a backstop, nor the ability of
a central bank to pursue its inflation objectives when the latter enjoys fiscal
backing or fiscal authorities are su¢ciently averse to inflation.
JEL classification: E58, E63, H63
Key words: Sovereign risk and default, Lender of last resort, Seigniorage,
inflationary financing
“[T]he proposition [is] that countries without a printing press
are subject to self-fulfilling crises in a way that nations that still
have a currency of their own are not."
Paul Krugman, “The Printing Press Mystery”, The conscience of a lib-
eral, August 17, 2011.
“Public debt is in aggregate not higher in the euro area than in
the US or Japan. [T]he central bank in those countries could act
and has acted as a backstop for government funding. This is an
important reason why markets spared their fiscal authorities the
loss of confidence that constrained many euro area governments’
market access.”
Mario Draghi, Luncheon Address: Unemployment in the Euro Area,
Jackson Hole Symposium, August 22, 2014.
1 Introduction
The recent sovereign debt crisis in the euro area and the launch of the Out-
right Monetary Transactions (OMTs) program by the European Central
Bank (ECB) in September 2012 has revived the academic and policy de-
bate on the role of monetary policy in shielding a country from belief-driven
speculation in the sovereign debt market (see Section 2 below). In the quote
above, the ECB president Mario Draghi argues that providing a backstop
for government debt is among the functions normally performed by a cen-
tral bank–whether operating in a monetary union or in a country with its
own currency. This argument raises two crucial questions, namely: what
are the mechanisms that allow a central bank to perform such a function
successfully? Under what conditions can a backstop be e§ective without
compromising its ability to pursue its primary objectives of inflation and
macroeconomic stability?
The contribution of this paper consists of analyzing in detail the core
mechanisms by which monetary authorities can rule out self-fulfilling sov-
ereign crises, relying on either conventional or unconventional monetary poli-
cies. In our model, welfare-maximizing fiscal and monetary authorities op-
timally choose their policy under discretion. Ex post, the fiscal authorities
set taxes and may choose outright repudiation by imposing haircuts on debt
holders, either in response to weak fiscal fundamentals or because of self-
fulfilling default expectations. Monetary authorities set inflation generating
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seigniorage and reducing the real value of debt. Hence default can occur via
haircuts on bond holder and/or inflationary debt debasement. In addition
to pursuing (conventional) inflation policy, however, monetary authorities
can engage in (unconventional) balance sheet policy, through outright pur-
chases of government debt. Whether via debt debasement or interventions
in the debt market, a monetary backstop for public debt that rules out self-
fulfilling sovereign default can be e§ective only if credible, i.e., feasible and
welfare-improving from the vantage point of monetary policymakers.
We show that the ability to generate (seigniorage) revenue and especially
debase nominal debt via inflation may enable a central bank to a§ect the
range of debt over which the economy is vulnerable to belief-driven default,
but is generally insu¢cient to eliminate welfare-decreasing equilibria driven
by self-fulfilling expectations (a point also stressed by Aguiar et al. 2013 and
Cooper and Camous 2014). This goal may require the use of unconventional
balance sheet policy.
In our analysis, this is where the “printing press” argument in the quote
by Krugman comes into play. Monetary authorities stand ready to honour
their own liabilities–not necessarily government debt–by redeeming them
for cash (fiat money) at their nominal value. Hence, by purchasing gov-
ernment paper while simultaneously issuing monetary liabilities, the central
bank e§ectively swaps default-risky public debt for its own liabilities with
a guaranteed face value, subject only to the risk of inflation.1 The implied
positive interest di§erential between government and monetary liabilities is
a precondition for a successful backstop. Because of this di§erential, cen-
tral bank interventions can reduce uncertainty and the overall cost of debt
service, altering the trade-o§s faced by a discretionary fiscal authority.
To characterize a credible backstop strategy, we show that there is a
critical threshold for central bank purchases of sovereign debt beyond which,
absent fundamental fiscal stress, default is never the preferred policy option.
This is because purchases of the appropriate size keep the cost of debt low
enough that the fiscal authorities will choose to adjust the primary surplus
rather than defaulting. Yet, default may still occur if fundamentals turns
out to be weak–raising the risk of losses on the central bank balance sheet.
Balance sheet losses need not impinge on the ability of the monetary
authorities to pursue optimal inflation if the government accepts negative
transfers from the central bank (i.e., it provides fiscal backing, see Del Negro
1See Gertler and Karadi (2012) for a similar notion of unconventional monetary policy
applied to ouright purchases of private assets. Together with us, the same point has been
recently emphasized by Hall and Reis (2015) and Reis (2013).
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and Sims 2014). Barring fiscal transfers under any circumstances, however,
the central bank’s commitment to honour its own liabilities in full becomes
inconsistent with pursuing optimal inflation policies in case of fundamen-
tal fiscal stress. Budget separation –requiring the central bank to be the
sole responsible for its own balance sheet–creates inflation risk, which may
in turn cause an equilibrium with central bank interventions to be welfare-
dominated by the equilibrium with belief-driven speculation. Budget sep-
aration may thus constrain credible backstops to be carried out only on a
scale that does not foreshadow strongly adverse consequences on the future
inflation choices by the central bank. A key result from our analysis is that
these restrictions are not relevant if fiscal and monetary authorities share
the same objectives (or more in general if the fiscal authority is su¢ciently
averse to inflation), and internalize the e§ects of own policy choices on over-
all distortions.
These results are important in light of concerns that, on the one hand,
large-scale purchases of government debt will eventually cause monetary
authorities to run high inflation, even when the backstop is successful in
ruling out belief-driven crises. On the other hand, the central bank may not
have the ability to expand its balance sheet on a su¢cient scale to e§ectively
backstop government debt. Our analysis suggests that an e§ective backstop
neither has to guarantee the government in all circumstances at the cost of
high inflation, nor has to match the full scale of the government financing.
While our framework builds upon Calvo (1988), our model and results
are related to a vast and growing literature on self-fulfilling debt crises, most
notably Cole and Kehoe (2002) and more recently Lorenzoni and Werning
(2014) and Nicolini et al. (2014), as well as sovereign default and sov-
ereign risk, see e.g. Arellano (2008) and Uribe (2006) among others. Jeanne
(2012) and Roch and Uhlig (2011) analyze the role of an external lender
of last resort. Cooper (2012) and Tirole (2012) study debt guarantees and
international bailouts in a currency union.
A few recent papers and ours complement each other in the analysis of
sovereign default and monetary policy. Discussing self-fulfilling debt crises,
Bacchetta et al. (2014) study the role of conventional monetary policy in
a new-Keynesian model, while Reis (2013) models the central bank balance
sheet in a similar way as ours. Both papers assume fiscal and monetary
policy follow exogenous rules, however. In a dynamic framework, Aguiar,
Amador, Farhi and Gopinath (2013) analyze a similar problem as in our
paper with optimizing fiscal and monetary authorities, focusing on inflation
policies rather than balance sheet policies.
The text is organized as follows. The next section gives an intuitive
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account of the gist of our argument and results, also putting our contribution
in the context of the literature. Section 3 presents our model economy,
and Section 4 derives the main results on equilibrium multiplicity under
conventional monetary policy. Section 5 contains the main results on the
central bank backstop, and Section 6 o§ers some conclusions.
2 What allows a central bank to backstop govern-
ment debt?
The main goal of our analysis is to understand which policies, if any, a
central bank can rely upon to shield a country from the disruptive e§ects
of self-fulfilling crises in the sovereign debt market. When policymakers act
under discretion, multiple equilibria are possible because, by determining the
equilibrium costs of issuing public debt, agents expectations impact on the
ex-post choices by the fiscal and monetary authorities: if agents arbitrarily
coordinate their expectations on anticipation of default on public debt, they
will require a high interest rate to finance the government; facing a high
interest bill, the government is more likely to choose to default (partially or
fully) on its liabilities, over the alternative of adjusting the primary surplus,
thus validating agents’ expectations.
Equilibrium multiplicity is illustrated by Figure 1, which summarizes
the main properties of our model economy in the absence of a successful
backstop. The figure plots the interest costs of issuing public debt, RBB,
measured on the y-axis, against the initial financing need of the government,
denoted by B, on the x-axis. As explained below in detail, the market in-
terest rate RB in the figure is set by risk-neutral rational investors, forming
expectations of taxation, default and inflation one-period ahead, knowing
that policymaking is discretionary and (exogenous) macroeconomic condi-
tions vary randomly. The states of the economy are parameterized as a
weak, average or high output.
In the figure, the interest costs faced by the government are overall in-
creasing in B but not continuously so. Because default has fixed costs, there
are threshold values of B, at which the interest rate RB jumps up, marking a
sharp increase in RBB. The three segments in the figure have a steeper slope
as we move to the right of the figure and, most crucially for our purposes,
overlap over two ranges of B (marked by a shaded area). In other words,
as the initial financing need of the government grows larger, higher interest
costs imply that the fiscal authority may find it optimal to default more,
and in more states of the world, rather than facing the economic distortions
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associated with adjusting the primary surplus to service debt in all circum-
stances. Over some ranges of debt, however, under rational expectations the
interest rate is not uniquely determined.
In the shaded region of B to the left of the figure, an equilibrium in
which the government does not default (labelled ND) coexists with another
equilibrium in which, if agents anticipate default to occur under weak macro-
economic conditions, the government validates their expectations (labelled
D). Here, the D equilibrium is “non-fundamental”, in the sense that fis-
cal distress is determined not by the exogenous state of the economy, but
by market expectations. Between the two shaded areas, the financing need
of the government are so high that the government would default under
macroeconomic stress even if investors bought government debt at the risk-
free rate R. Yet, there is no other equilibrium in which the government
would find it optimal to repudiate debt in better states of the economy than
the weak one: over the region of debt in between the two shaded area, the
D equilibrium is unique and fundamental.
Default in more states of the world becomes again a possibility for higher
values of B, under the second shaded area to the right of the figure. Here,
an equilibrium with fundamental default only when fundamentals turns out
to be weak (D), coexists with an equilibrium with self-fulfilling expectations
of (non-fundamental) default also under average macroeconomic conditions
(DD). In the economic environment illustrated by Figure 1, our question is
whether and how a central bank can prevent a rise in interest rates driven by
arbitrary anticipations of outright default, de facto eliminating the overlap
between segments.
Somewhat paradoxically, early seminal work on self-fulfilling debt crises
in a monetary economy, by Calvo (1988), envisions monetary policy as part
of the problem, rather than as part of the solution. Calvo assumes bounded
costs of inflation. In this case (or, as we will see below, when these costs
are not bounded but do not grow too fast), as long as the central bank acts
under discretion, non-fundamental hikes in interest rates can be driven by
self-fulfilling expectations of debt debasement through bouts of inflation–in
addition or in alternative to self-fulfilling expectations of outright default).
More recent contributions take quite a di§erent perspective on the role
of monetary policy. In a number of papers (see e.g. Aguiar et al. 2013 and
Cooper and Camus 2014), the main focus is on the option to inflate away
debt, as an o§-equilibrium threat the central bank can use to coordinate
market expectations on the fundamental equilibrium. The threat works as
follows. In response to a hike in interest rates due to belief-driven anticipa-
tions of outright default, the central bank stands ready to engineer inflation
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and reduce ex-post the real value of the interest bill. A fall in the real interest
costs in turn eliminates the need for large and costly adjustment in primary
surpluses that would otherwise make outright default attractive. The key
issue is whether (under what conditions) can such a threat be credible, that
is, feasible and welfare-enhancing from the perspective of monetary authori-
ties. Essentially because of the ensuing costs of high inflation, the literature
concludes that, in general, this type of policy provides an e§ective backstop
to government debt only under strict conditions.2 In the model underlying
Figure 1, indeed, the option to inflate away debt is available to the central
bank, but is used only at the margin. At best, it improves the resilience
of the economy to debt crises, but does not rule out multiplicity. Similar
conclusions are reached in models allowing for nominal rigidities, whereas
inflationary monetary expansions have the additional benefit of lowering the
interest rate in real terms and, to the extent that they raise current output
and thus current tax revenue, they also reduce the initial financing need of
the government (see e.g. Bacchetta et al. 2015).
The threat of inflationary debt debasement, however, is not the only
strategy available to monetary authorities. As a matter of fact, the policy
debate on monetary backstops typically revolves around another option,
that is, purchases of debt by the central bank. Relative to the threat of
inflationary debasement of public nominal liabilities, the key di§erence is
that this second option aims at lowering the government’s borrowing costs
ex-ante, at the time of debt issuance, rather then ex post, after debt has
been issued at high nominal costs.
The central question is then how can debt purchases by the monetary
authority lower the overall costs of issuing public debt. From an aggregate
perspective, the liabilities of the public sector are ultimately backed by cur-
rent and future primary surpluses cum seigniorage, that is, by resources con-
tributed by domestic taxpayers: the central bank is not an external lender
of last resort that can throw in extra resources, in addition to the overall
fiscal capacity of a country.
The answer to the above question is arguably easy to grasp when the
interest rate is at its zero lower bound and the economy is in a liquidity trap
(similar to the circumstances following the global crisis of 2008 in advanced
countries). In a liquidity trap, it is well understood that central banks are
able to issue fiat money at will and buy government paper, without any
2 In Aguiar et al. (2013), for instance, these conditions include a contingent lengthening
of the maturity of public debt, so that debt debasement can be accomplished via sustained
but moderate inflation over time–essentially, smoothing the costs of inflation debasement
across periods.
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impact on current prices, as long as these purchases are not permanent. In
economies vulnerable to self-fulfilling debt crises, however, even temporary
purchases have at least one consequential e§ect: they reduce the amount
of default-risky debt that the government needs to sell to the market, sub-
stituting it with fiat money–e§ectively, a safe short-term asset on which
agents expect no haircut.3
In the theory and practice of monetary policy, imperfect substitutability
between monetary liabilities and other assets has long provided the founda-
tions of open market operations and the e§ectiveness of conventional mone-
tary policy, see Wallace (1981). Central bank liabilities, in the form of cash
and bank reserves, do di§er from the government’s in that the former are
a claim to cash–by its nature, fiat money is a claim on itself–and central
banks can always make good on their debt by running the printing press.
The monetary literature takes for granted that central banks will make no
discretionary attempt to tamper with the face value of the monetary base.
The point we stress in this paper is that imperfect substitutability between
monetary liabilities and other assets is also an integral component of mone-
tary backstops. When a central bank buys debt issuing monetary base and
reserves, it e§ectively swaps default-risky debt, with default-free liabilities–
government debt exposed to both inflation and default risk, with core central
bank liabilities exposed to inflation risk, but not to default risk. Because
of the price di§erence, such a swap lowers the overall costs of borrowing for
the public sector.
While the working of a monetary backstop via non-inflationary debt
purchases is easy to grasp when rates are at the zero lower bound, by no
means its logic applies only in a liquidity trap. As systematically analyzed
by ongoing work on the “new style central banking” exploring the theoretical
foundations and practical arrangement of unconventional monetary policy,
central banks can and do operate via balance sheet expansions in a variety of
circumstances–see Bassetto and Messer (2013), Del Negro and Sims (2014)
3The former ECB president, Jean-Claude Trichet writes: “I think we have to reflect
more on the reason why the purchases of Treasuries appeared appropriate in the aftermath
of the crisis despite the paradox that they seem to have a modest e§ect on the economy
as a whole [. . . ]. Such purchases might have played the role of an insurance policy against
any start of materialization of the ultimate tail risk: the challenge to sovereign signatures
(not only the weakest European ones) [. . . ]. The counterfactual is naturally impossible to
figure out. But it is illegitimate to wonder what could have happened, in the past three
years, if a number of central banks had not purchased any Treasuries, at a moment when
investors and savers, losing confidence, were starting to put into question all signatures,
including the traditionally unchallengeable risk-free?” Jean-Claude Trichet, 2013.
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and Hall and Reis (2015) among others. A key institutional development is
that policymakers entertain the option to pay interest rates on reserves. By
virtue of this option, central banks can engage in non-inflationary expansions
of their balance sheet even when policy rates are not at zero, as reserves are
issued at the equilibrium interest rate, consistent with expectations of future
inflation.4 As long as it is understood that monetary liabilities will always
be convertible into cash/fiat money at face value, reserves will earn a lower
interest than government debt.5
In the rest of paper, we emphasize a central bank’s ability to purchase
default-risky government debt financed by issuing default-free monetary lia-
bilities as a precondition for implementing a successful monetary backstop,
and analyze in details the conditions under which monetary authorities can
rely on it to rule out equilibria with self-fulfilling sovereign crises. As in
the case of inflationary debt debasement, the central bank may provide a
successful backstop by threatening to intervene in the debt market, rather
than carrying out actual debt purchases. Its analysis will thus require a
thorough discussion of the credibility of such threat.
In this respect, the second multiplicity region in Figure 1 should be
emphasized as a qualifying feature for a model of backstops–that distin-
guishes our contribution to the literature. Only in this regions is a discussion
of central bank’s balance sheet losses meaningful, as default may occur (for
fundamental reasons) even after monetary interventions in the debt market
are successful in eliminating self-fulfilling default. We carry out such a dis-
cussion in Section 5. We should also stress that, by virtue of its tractability,
our model sheds light on a number of key analytical features of the litera-
ture on non-fundamental debt crisis. By way of example, in section 4, we
will show that the size of the multiplicity regions is generally proportional
to the spread between the interest costs of government debt across the non-
fundamental and the non-fundamental equilibrium; and that well-behaved
equilibria in which the cost of debt issuance is increasing in B (as shown in
the figure), requires that the interest bill is honoured in full in some state of
the world with strictly positive probability.
4Whether or not the economy is in a liquidity trap, of course, a large change in the size
of a central bank balance sheet may create inflation risk in the future. To avoid this risk,
enough fiscal and monetary adjustment is required in the future, to manage and possibly
accompany a reduction of the size of the central bank balance sheet over time. We will
address this issue formally in our analysis below.
5 It is worth noting that in the literature on the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level, the
central bank is committed to ensure that all public liabilities, fiscal and monetary, are
always honored at face value–see Leeper (1991) Sims (1994) and Woodford (1995). Here,
the central bank only honors monetary liabilities at face value.
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3 A model of self-fulfilling sovereign crises and
monetary policy
In this section we describe the model, discuss policy instruments and distor-
tions, and characterize the optimal fiscal and monetary strategies. Since we
are interested in the mechanism by which, given the government financing
needs, outright default is precipitated by agents expectations (rather than,
say, in the determinants of public debt accumulation), as in Calvo (1988)
we develop our analysis in a two-period economy framework.
3.1 The model setup
Consider a two-period endowment economy, populated by a continuum of
identical risk-neutral agents who derive utility from consuming in period 2
only. Initially (in period 1), agents are endowed with a stock of financial
wealth W , which they can invest in public debt, B, central bank liabilities
H (if any are issued), as well as in a safe asset K supplied with infinite
elasticity and paying a constant real rate, denoted by ρ. In period 2, they
receive a random output realization, and the payo§s from their assets; they
pay taxes and consume. The economy can be in one of three states: High,
Average, or Low (H,A,L) state with (strictly positive) probability 1 − γ,
γµ and γ (1− µ), respectively.
Fiscal and a monetary authorities are both benevolent–they maximize
the same objective function given by the utility of the presentative agent–
but act under discretion and independently of each other. In the first period,
the fiscal authority (the government) faces an exogenously given financing
need equal to B, and issue bonds at the market-determined nominal rate
RB.6 The monetary authority may decide to purchase a share ! 2 [0, 1]
of the outstanding debt at some policy rate RB which may di§er from
the market. To finance its debt purchases, the central bank issues inter-
est bearing liabilities H = !B, at the risk-free nominal rate R. So, out
of total debt, (1− !)B is held by private investors, !B is on the central
bank balance sheet. Consumers’ wealth in the first period is thus equal to
W = (1− !)B +K +H.
In the second period, taking interest rates and central bank policy as
given, the fiscal authority sets taxes T and may choose to impose a haircut
6As long as the initial financial need of the government is given, it is immaterial whether
we follow Calvo’s specification or we model discount bonds–see Lorenzoni and Werning
2014. The set of equilibria would instead be di§erent in a model after Cole and Kehoe
2000, where multiplicity arises via discretionary default on the initial stock of liabilities.
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θi 2 [0, 1] on bond holders, including the central bank. By the same token,
taking interest rates and fiscal policy as given, the monetary authority sets
inflation πi and makes good on any liability it may have, paying RH to
private investors.
3.1.1 Policy instruments and distortions
The instruments of fiscal policy, taxation (primary surplus) and default,
induce distortions that a§ect net output and may aggravate the budget.
Taxation results in a dead-weight loss of output indexed by z (Ti, Yi), where
from now on a subscript i will refer to the output state i = H,A,L.7 The
function z (.) is convex in Ti, satisfying standard regularity conditions. We
realistically assume that, to raise a given level of tax revenue, dead-weight
losses are larger, and grow faster in Ti, the lower the realization of output,
that is:
z (T ;YL) > z (T ;YA) > z(T ;YH), (1)
z0 (T ;YL) > z0 (T ;YA) > z0(T ;YH).
Since what matters in our analysis is the size of the primary surplus, rather
than the individual components of the budget, for simplicity we denote
with G a constant, nondefaultable level of government spending, and use
taxation or primary surplus interchangeably. For notational simplicity, when
unambiguous, we will write the function omitting the output argument, i.e.,
z (Ti;Yi) = z (Ti) .
Sovereign default may entail di§erent types of costs, associated with a
contraction of economic activity and transaction costs in the repudiation
of government liabilities. In the theoretical literature, some contributions
(see e.g. Arellano 2008 and Cole and Kehoe 2000) posit that a default
causes output to contract by a fixed amount. In other contributions (see
e.g. Calvo 1988) the cost of default falls on the budget and is commensurate
to the extent of the loss imposed on investors. While the relative weight
7 It can be easily shown that the function z () corresponds to the distortions cause by
income taxes on the allocation in an economy with an endogenous labor supply. In general,
while we encompass trade-o§s across di§erent distortions in a reduced-form fashion, in
doing so we draw on a vast literature, ranging from the analysis of the macroeconomic
costs of inflation, in the Kydland-Prescott but especially in the new-Keynesian tradition
(see e.g. Woodford 2003), to the analysis of the trade-o§s inherent in inflationary financing
(e.g. Barro 1983), or the role of debt in shaping discretionary monetary and fiscal policy
(e.g. Diaz et al. 2008 and Martin 2009), and, last but not least, the commitment versus
discretion debate in public policy (e.g. Persson and Tabellini 1993).
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of di§erent default costs is ultimately an empirical matter (see e.g. Cruces
and Trebesch 2012), alternative assumptions are consequential for policy
trade-o§s and the properties of equilibria. As explained below, multiplicity
of well-behaved equilibria can only arise with fixed costs; with variable costs,
the equilibrium rate of default responds to central bank interventions. For
these reasons, we prefer not to restrict our model to one type of costs only.
Rather, we posit that outright default in period 2 entails a loss of Φ units
of output regardless of the size of default and the state of the economy,8
and aggravate the budget in proportion to the size of default. Namely,
upon defaulting, the government incurs a financial outlay equal to a fraction
α 2 (0, 1) of the total size of default on private agents θi (1− !)BRB–the
costs of defaulting on the central bank are discussed below.9
Like taxation, also inflation has distortionary e§ects on economic activ-
ity. We posit that the costs of inflation are isomorphic to those of taxation:
output is lost according to a convex function C (πi), normalized such that
C (0) = C 0 (0) = 0 – a standard instance being C (π) =
λ
2
π2. For sim-
plicity, as in Calvo (1988), we assume that inflation in period 2 generates
seigniorage revenue according to the function
Seigniorage =
πi
1 + πi
κ. (2)
where a constant κ implies that there is no La§er curve.10
As explained above, in addition to setting inflation in period 2, monetary
authorities have the option to purchase government debt, issuing liabilities
at the default-free nominal rate in period 1. From a policy perspective,
this distinction between conventional and unconventional monetary policy
8The fixed component of the cost squares well with the presumption that the decision
to breach government contracts, even with a small haircut, marks a discontinuity in the
e§ects of such policy on economic activity. As we show below, e§ectively this assumption
entails that there is a minimum threshold for the haircut θ applied by the government
under default.
9Calvo (1988) motivates variable costs of default stressing legal and transaction fees
associated to debt repudiation. In a broader sense, one could include disruption of financial
intermediaries (banks and pension funds) that may require government support. Note that
our results would go through if the variable costs of default were in output units, rather
than a§ecting the budget. The main di§erence would be that the perceived marginal
benefit of default for the fiscal authority would be 1 instead of 1 − α; the marginal cost
would remain equal to α.
10We refer to the specification in Calvo (1988), who restricts the demand for (non-
interest bearing) fiat money to the case of a constant velocity, and abstracts from specifying
a terminal condition. Note that our setup can be easily generalized to encompass an
inflation La§er curve, making κ a decreasing function of inflation.
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reflects key institutional developments of modern central banking. From
a modelling perspective, assuming that monetary reserves H are interest
bearing allows us to introduce a demand for central bank liabilities (for a
given price level) in the first period, consistent with the discretionary choice
of inflation (the conventional monetary instrument) in the second period.11
3.1.2 Budget constraints of the fiscal and the monetary authority
In order to write the budget constraint of the government and the cen-
tral bank, there are at least three interrelated issues that need to be ad-
dressed. The first two concern whether a government that opts to default is
able/willing (i) to discriminate between private investors and monetary au-
thorities, applying di§erent haircuts; (ii) to transfer resources to the central
bank. The third one concerns the budget costs of defaulting, if any, on the
central bank.
For clarity of exposition and analytical convenience, we proceed under
the following assumptions: first, the government applies the same haircut θi
rate to all debt holders, corresponding to a pari passu clause in government
paper; second, the budget cost of defaulting on the central bank is isomor-
phic to the costs of defaulting on the private investors, i.e. it is a budget cost
proportional to the haircut rate, but not necessarily identical–we stipulate
1 > α > αCB ≥ 0.
Under a pari passu rule, and allowing for 0 ≤ αCB ≤ α, the budget
constraint of the fiscal authority reads:
Ti−G = [1− θi (1− α)] RB
1 + πi
(1− !)B+[1− θi (1− αCB)] RB
1 + πi
!B−Ti
(3)
where RB is the market interest rate at which agents buy the share of
government debt (1− !)B not purchased by the central bank, RB is the
intervention rate at which the central bank purchases bonds, and Ti denotes
transfers from the central bank to the fiscal authority in state i. The budget
11 In dynamic monetary models, buying government debt by increasing the money stock
does not necessarily result in higher current inflation, as the latter mainly reflects future
money growth (see e.g. Diaz et al. (2008) and Martin (2009), placing this consideration
at the heart of their analysis of time inconsistency in monetary policy).
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constraint of the central bank in the second period is:
Ti = πi
1 + πi
κ+
(1− θi)RB
1 + πi
!B − R
1 + πi
H = (4)
=
πi
1 + πi
κ+
!
(1− θi)RB
1 + πi
− R
1 + πi
"
!B.
Budget interactions between the fiscal and monetary authorities are reg-
ulated by institutional rules that typically hold central banks responsible
for backing their own liabilities – constraining modalities and size of fiscal
transfers to the central bank. If the central bank intervenes in the sovereign
debt market and exposes its balance sheet to default risk, then, the need to
make up for ex-post losses may weigh on monetary policy decisions. Insti-
tutional constraints on transfers, however, are not always binding, and may
be relaxed in exceptional circumstances, whereas the fiscal authorities stand
ready to provide contingent transfers (i.e. “fiscal backing”) to the monetary
authorities, to prevent balance sheet losses from conditioning the conduct
of monetary policy (see e.g. Del Negro and Sims 2014).
In light of these considerations, it is important to analyze monetary
backstops under either case. Namely, we will first derive analytical results
under the assumption that the constraint on fiscal transfers to the central
bank (if any) is either relaxed or not binding. In this case, we can consolidate
the two budget constraints above as follows:
Ti −G+ πi
1 + πi
κ = (5)
[1− θi (1− α)]RB
1 + πi
(1− !)B +
#
R
1 + πi
+
αCBθiRB
1 + πi
$
!B.
In a final section, we revisit our main results accounting for a binding cen-
tral bank constraint–which, without loss of generality, we model as the
requirement Ti ≥ 0.
Under full fiscal backing, the expression (5) clarifies that, no matter
how large the increase in the central bank balance sheet (!B) in period 1
is, a large enough primary surplus (net of the ex post interest bill of the
government) allows the central bank to redeem its nominal liabilities from
the market in period 2, without impinging on the desired level of inflation.
Conversely, if transfer to the central bank are ruled out by (an unbreakable)
law (i.e., Ti ≥ 0 always), by (4) it is apparent that, in case of large losses,
honoring the outstanding stock nominal liabilities H at face value requires
a rate of inflation large enough to satisfy:
πiκ+
%
(1− θi)RB −R
&
!B = 0. (6)
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Monetary authorities must ensure that the (present discounted value of)
seigniorage equals repayment of their liabilities.
3.2 Risk neutral agents and debt pricing
Under risk neutrality, the utility of the representative agent coincides with
consumption in period 2:
Ui = Yi − z (Ti;Yi)− Ti − πi
1 + πi
κ+ (7)
KR+
(1− θi)RB
1 + πi
(1− !)B + R
1 + πi
H− C (πi) ,
where, ex post, the net real asset payo§s are determined by the realization
of default and inflation. Ex ante, the expected real returns on government
bonds are equalized to the constant, safe return on the real asset:
RB
'
(1− γ) 1− θH
1 + πH
+ γ
#
µ
1− θA
1 + πA
+ (1− µ) 1− θL
1 + πL
$(
= ρ. (8)
The interest parity condition pins down the price of government debt as a
function of both expected default and expected inflation rates.
When both B and H are traded, there is a second equilibrium interest
parity condition: the interest rate on reserves R, free from outright default
risk, must equal the real rate ρ, adjusted by expected inflation:
R
#
1− γ
1 + πH
+ γ
!
µ
1 + πA
+
(1− µ)
1 + πL
"$
= ρ. (9)
Comparing this expression with (8), it is apparent that, in equilibrium, the
interest rate on government debt must exceed the interest paid on central
bank’s liabilities by the expected rate of default.
3.3 Optimal discretionary plans for inflation, taxation and
default
In this subsection, we characterize the policy plan set by the fiscal and
monetary authorities under discretion in period 2. The two authorities in-
dependently maximize the same objective function, given by (7), subject
to the consolidated budget constraint (5) (with multiplier λ), and the con-
straint Ti ≥ 0 on the central bank budget (with multiplier λCB ≥ 0). In
doing so, they take as given (i) the rates of return on all assets set in pe-
riod 1, (ii) the scale of interventions by the Central Bank in period 1, and
14
(iii) each other instruments. These optimal discretionary inflation, taxa-
tion and default plans can thus be written in terms of the following func-
tions: πσi = πi
%
RB, B,R,!, RB, Ti, θi
&
, T σi = Ti
%
RB, B,R,!, RB,πi
&
and
θσi = θi
%
RB, B,R,!, RB,πi
&
. Here a superscript σ indicates that the first
order conditions of the policy problems identify “best responses” by the re-
spective policy authorities (to be dropped from equilibrium values). Note
that these best responses are each a function of the initial financing need of
the government B and central bank’s interventions !.
3.3.1 The authorities’ best responses
The fiscal authority will choose to default when the welfare(=consumption)
gains from reducing distortionary taxation after the implementation of an
optimal haircut exceeds the fixed and variable costs of default, net of output
losses due to inflation, so that:
Ui (θ
σ
i > 0) ≥ Ui (θσi = 0) (10)
To study the conditions for optimal default, thus, we need to character-
ize first the optimal plan for taxation and inflation given the government
decision to either default or service its debt in full.
The first order condition of the fiscal authority problem yields:
z0 (T σi ;Yi) =
α (1− !)RB +
%
αCB + λ
CB
i
& · !RB
(1− α) (1− !)RB − αCB!RB
, (11)
If the constraint on the admissible haircut rate θi 2 (0, 1] is not binding,
the above condition determines the optimal taxation. Once this is set, the
optimal haircut rate θσi is obtained from the budget constraint of the gov-
ernment (3). In an interior solution, the fiscal authorities set taxes trading
o§ the output costs of distortionary taxation, with the benefits of reducing
the haircut rates so to contain the budget (variable) costs of default. Note
that, when the central bank budget constraint is binding (the multiplier
λCBi is strictly positive), a government who cares about inflation will tend
to set higher taxes and reduce the optimal haircut rate, so to contain the
inflationary consequences of losses on the central bank balance sheet.
If there is no interior solution to the problem, the government either
services its liabilities in full, or impose a 100 percent haircut on bond holders.
In either case, taxation T σi is no longer chosen optimally, but adjusts as to
satisfy the budget constraint (3) (or (5)), evaluated at either θσi = 0 or
θσi = 1.
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The first order condition of the monetary authority problem is:
(1 + πσi )
2 C0 (πσi ) = z0 (Ti;Yi) [κ+ (1− !)BRB +R!B] (12)
+ θσi
'
z0 (Ti;Yi)
)− (1− α) (1− !)BRB + αCBRB!B*
+α (1− !)BRB +
)
αCBRB
*
!B
(
+ λCBi ·
)
κ− %(1− θi)RB −R&!B* ,
The central bank set inflation by trading o§ the output cost of inflation with
the output benefits from reducing distortionary income taxation net of the
costs of default (if any). Under discretion, the monetary authorities will
always choose a non-negative rate of inflation. The optimal inflation rate
would positive even if printing money generates no seigniorage revenue (κ =
0). This is because a discretionary monetary authority will not resist the
temptation to inflate nominal debt, if only moderately so (according to the
condition above). Positive and rapidly rising costs of inflation nonetheless
prevent policymakers from attempting to wipe away the debt with a bout
of very high inflation. It follows that, in state of the world in which there
is no default (for θσi = 0), the constraint on the central bank budget never
binds (λCB = 0), and the above expression simplifies to:
(1 + πσi )
2 C0 (πσi ) = z0 (T σi ;Yi) [κ+ (1− !)BRB +R!B] .
Observe that the optimal plan described above minimizes the joint dis-
tortions induced by taxation and default, on the one hand, and inflation, on
the other hand. In general, since policymakers are benevolent and share the
same objective function, they will want to rely on the simultaneous use of
all available instruments–ruling out an uneven resort to extreme inflation
as a substitute for outright default.
3.3.2 The plan under a consolidated budget constraint
To make progress on the analytical characterization of our results, it is
useful to focus on the case in which the constraint on the central bank is not
binding, λCBi = 0–an endogenous outcome in Section 4, an assumption in
section 5.1 below. Furthermore, throughout our text we will disregard the
budget costs of defaulting on the central bank holdings of debt, i.e., we set
αCB = 0. Notation-wise, we will distinguish policy variables in the case of
interior default using a ‘hat’ ˆ, as opposed to the case of complete default,
using a ‘tilde’e.
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Under these assumptions and notational convention, the optimal level of
taxes, bT σi in the case of an interior default simplifies to:
z0
-bT σi ;Yi. = z0 -bTi;Yi. = α1− α . (13)
Taxation is constant across interior default rates–so that we can drop the
superscript σ. The optimal inflation plan is set according to:
(1 + bπσi )2 C0 (bπσi ) = (1 + bπσ)2 C0 (bπσ) = α1− α [κ+ (1− !)BRB + !BR]
(14)
The optimal inflation rate will therefore be independent of the state of the
world i. Given bTi, then, the optimal default rate (derived from the consoli-
dated budget constraint) is:
bθσi = (1− !)BRB + !RB − (1 + bπσ)
-bTi −G.− bπσκ
(1− α) (1− !)BRB .
In the case of complete default, instead, taxation eT σi (set to satisfy the
consolidated budget constraint) is always state contingent:
eT σi = G− eπσi1 + eπσi κ+ αRB1 + eπσi (1− !)B + R1 + eπσi !B.
So is the inflation plan, determined by:
(1 + eπσi )2 C0 (eπσi ) = z0 -eT σi . [κ+ α (1− !)BRB + !BR]
+ α (1− !)BRB,
For the case of an interior solution to the haircut rate, the optimal out-
right default condition (10) can then be written as
Φ+ z
-bTi.+ C (bπσ) + αbθσi RB1 + bπσ (1− !)B (15)
≤ z (T σi ) + C (πσi )
where θi is the minimum rate at which the government finds it optimal to
default (derived solving the expression above with an equality sign). Because
of the fixed output costs Φ, optimal default only occurs at strictly positive
rates, hence θi > 0. If an interior solution does not exist, bθσi , Tˆi, and bπσ in
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the condition above are replaced with 1, eT σi , eπσi and the default condition
reads:
If bθσi > 1 : Φ+ z -eT σi .+ C (eπσi ) + α RB1 + eπσi (1− !)B (16)
≤ z (T σi ) + C (πσi ) .
4 Inflation and macroeconomic resilience to self-
fulfilling crises
We start our study of monetary policy in economies vulnerable to self-
fulfilling debt crises restricting the central bank to rely exclusively on con-
ventional policies, i.e. the central bank only sets inflation. As stressed by
Calvo (1988), some degree of “stealth repudiation” is a natural outcome in
a monetary economy, because unexpected changes in inflation rates a§ect
the ex-post real returns on assets which are not indexed to the price level.
In our monetary model, indeed, repudiation in period 2 can take the form
of either outright default on the nominal value of debt, or inflation surprises
reducing the real value of debt, or both.12
In what follows, we will characterize the set of equilibria conditional
on no debt purchases by the central bank, i.e. ! = 0. We will first dis-
cuss the properties of inflation implied by the optimal discretionary policy
plan, state the definition of equilibrium and establish that, under a stan-
dard specification of its distortionary costs, inflation is uniquely determined
in equilibrium. We will then identify the conditions for equilibrium multi-
plicity to occur, and discuss the extent to which inflation policy can enhance
the resilience of a country to sovereign debt crises.
4.1 Properties of the optimal inflation plans
We have seen that, under discretion, inflation rates will always be positive in
equilibrium–in our nominal economy, government spending will be financed
at least in part through seigniorage and some debasement of outstanding (ex-
default) public liabilities. Since Ti > 0 in all states of nature, and we can
replace the budget constraints of the two authorities with the consolidated
one, the optimal inflation plan will always be set according to the first order
12This is di§erent from Calvo (1988), where default is implemented alternatively through
outright repudiation (in the real version of the model), or inflation only (in the monetary
version).
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condition:
(1 + πσi )
2 C0 (πσi ) = z0(T σi ) (κ+BRB) + θσi BRB
)
α− z0(T σi ) (1− α)
*
(17)
The optimal policy plan is synthesized in Table 1 below, where the min-
imum (interior) default rate (27) is obtained from the default condition (15)
setting bθσi = θi and using the fact that, for ! = 0, the cost of debt issuance
can be written as
BRB =
(1 + πˆ)
-
Tˆi −G
.
+ πˆκ
1− bθσi (1− α) . (18)
When (27) is satisfied for a θi exceeding 100 percent (as is the case if the pri-
mary surplus under interior default
-
Tˆi −G
.
+ πˆκ/ (1 + πˆ) is non-positive)
the government opts for complete default.
In words: under an optimal default plan θi ≤ bθσi ≤ 1, inflation is identical
across states of the world, i.e., bπσA = bπσL = bπσ–see the conditions (21)
and (22).13 If the constraint 1 ≥ bθσi is binding and default is complete,
inflation plans are instead state dependent, as taxes and seigniorage will
have to adjust to cover current non-interest expenditure according to (23)
and (24). The same applies under no outright default (θσi = 0), whereas
the revenue from taxation and seigniorage needs to adjust according to (25)
and (26) to finance the government real expenditure and interest bill in full.
Furthermore, in either corner solution for default, πσi and eπσi always comoves
positively with T σi and eT σi , hence inflation inherits the same properties as
taxation. For instance, it must be that taxes under full default are not
lower than taxes under partial default, namely eT σi ≥ Tˆi. It follows that
output distortions due to both taxation and inflation are higher under full
default, including at the margin, since
z0( eT σi ) ≥ α/ (1− α) . (19)
13This property of the optimal inflation rate depends on the simplifying assumption
that the cost of inflation does not vary with the state of the world. It would be easy to
relax this assumption, at the cost of cluttering the notation without much gain in terms
of economic intuition.
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Table 1
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
If 1 ≥ bθσi = 11− α
241− (1 + bπσ)
-
Tˆi −G
.
+ bπσκ
BRB
35 ≥ θi > 0 : (20)
θσi =
bθσi T σi = bTi = z0−1 - α1−α ;Yi. (21)
and (1 + bπσ)2 C0 (bπσ) = α1−α (κ+BRB) (22)
If bθσi > 1 : θσi = 1 eT σi = G+ α RB1+eπσi B − eπσi1+eπσi κ
(23)
and (1 + eπσi )2 C0 (eπσi ) = z0( eT σi ) (κ+ αBRB) + αBRB (24)
If bθσi < θi : θσi = 0 T σi = RB1+πσi B +G− πσi1 + πσi κ (25)
and (1 + πσi )
2 C0 (πσi ) = z0(T σi ) (κ+BRB) (26)
θi solves Φ = z
0@G− πσi
1 + πσi
κ+
1 + πˆ
1 + πσi
-
Tˆi −G
.
+ πˆ1+πˆκ
1− θi (1− α)
1A− z -Tˆi.
(27)
+C (πσi )− C (πˆ)− αθi
-
Tˆi −G
.
+ πˆ1+πˆκ
1− θi (1− α)
.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
The following lemma summarizes key properties of inflation that will
play an important role in our results. Namely, the best response of inflation
(and thus its equilibrium value) is increasing in the ex-ante interest rate
RB and stock of debt B. The best responses are such that inflation rates
under full default cannot be lower than inflation rates under partial default.
Finally, at the corner solutions for the default rate, θσi = {0, 1} , inflation
rates πi and eπi are both increasing across states H,A,L, that is, inflation
is higher when the state of the economy is worse and tax distortions are
higher.
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Lemma 1 Inflation best responses (πσi , πˆ, eπσi ) are i) increasing in the ex-
pected sovereign rate RB and stock of debt B, where πˆ ≤ eπσi ; ii) such that
(πσi , eπσi ) > -πσj , eπσj . if z (·;Yi) > z (·;Yj), while πˆ is constant across states.
These properties are intuitive in light of our assumption of convex costs
of inflation, C (πσi ) , which translates into decreasing marginal benefits from
its use. Property i) follows from inspection of the inflation reaction function
(17). In this expression, the right-hand-side is increasing in RBB, since
taxes are weakly increasing in the interest rate bill. Moreover, by (19),
taxes under full default are at least as high as taxes under partial default
( eT σi ≥ Tˆi). Property ii) descends directly from our ordering of tax distortions
z (·;Yi) across states, stipulating that distortions are worse, the weaker the
fundamentals.
4.2 Equilibrium definition
A rational-expectation equilibrium is defined by the pricing conditions (8),
together with the consolidated budget constraint (5) with ! = 0, the optimal
tax rates, either (21) or (23), or (25), given the default option (15) or (16)
with ! = 0, and the optimal inflation, either (22) or (24) or (26).
For the purpose of our analysis, we are interested in studying economies
where, in equilibrium, fundamental default may or may not occur in state
L under fiscal stress, but there is no fundamental reason for defaulting in
states A,H. Consistent with this goal, we find it convenient to impose mild
conditions on our specification such that, for increasing initial financing
needs of the government B, we obtain the set of equilibria represented in
Figure 1:
1. an equilibrium with no default, which we denote with a superscript
ND;
2. an equilibrium with full default in state L and no default in the other
states, which we denote with a superscript D;
3. an equilibrium with full default in L and partial default in A which
we denote with DD.
The following three assumptions detail su¢cient conditions for these
equilibria to be admissible.
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Assumption 1: The primary surplus across states of the world satisfies
the following restrictions:
BL < (1− γ)
-bTA −G. /ρ < -bTA −G. /ρ < -bTH −G. /ρ (28)
The condition (28) establishes a reasonable ordering between the primary
surplus under interior default in the high (H) and the average (A) state, and
stipulates that both must be larger than required to service the maximum
level of debt
%
BL
&
sustainable in a state of fiscal stress (L), at the real risk
free rate ρ.
A second assumption is motivated by our interest in studying equilibria
which are well-behaved, i.e., “stable” by the Walrasian criterion discussed,
e.g., by Lorenzoni and Werning (2014). By this criterion, a small increase in
the supply of government bonds should not lower the notional interest rate
(i.e., it should not raise the price of the bond).
Assumption 2: The probability of state H, 1− γ, and of state A, γµ,
are such that:
1− γ > α, (29)
1 + πˆDD
1 + πDDH
> µ > 0.
These conditions ensure that there is a range of debt B for which our model
features well-behaved, stable multiple equilibria, in which sovereign rates
have the intuitive, desirable property of being increasing in the initial level
of public debt, B. Note that the second condition, stipulating that the prob-
ability of the intermediate state should not be too high, is always satisfied
if πi = 0 for any i. We should nonetheless stress that (29) does not rule
out the existence of other equilibria which are not well-behaved, i.e., “un-
stable” by the Walrasian criterion, which may coexist with the stable ones.
By the same argument set forth by Lorenzoni and Werning (2014), in what
follows we will abstract from these equilibria, on the ground that they have
pathological, unpalatable implications for policy.14
The last condition–that the primary surplus in state L is at most zero
when seigniorage revenue is at its maximum κ–is imposed for the sake of
analytical tractability.
14 In (Walrasian-)unstable equilibria, such as the one discussed by Calvo (1988), the
economy is vulnerable to self-fulfilling crisis for small levels (but not for high levels) of
debt, and sovereign rates are decreasing in the stock of debt. In an analysis of backstops,
interventions by the central bank should be negative, i.e., the central bank should actually
sell government debt in response to the threat of a run on debt.
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Assumption 3: -bTL −G.+ κ! 0. (30)
As shown above, see (27), this implies that a rational expectation equilibrium
will have either no default or complete default in state L. We will nonetheless
study partial default in the A state in the DD equilibrium–whereas the
interior optimal rate bθDDA is given by:
bθDDA = Bρ−
h
(1− γ) 1+bπDD
1+πDDH
+ γµ
i h-
TˆA −G
.
+ bπDD
1+bπDD κ
i
(1− α)Bρ− γµ
h-
TˆA −G
.
+ bπDD
1+bπDD κ
i ≥ θDDA > 0.
(31)
Under the assumptions just spelled out, the sovereign interest rates
across equilibria are, respectively,
RNDB = R =
'
(1− γ)
1 + πNDH
+ γ
#
µ
1 + πNDA
+
(1− µ)
1 + πNDL
$(−1
ρ (32)
RDB =
'
(1− γ)
1 + πDH
+
γµ
1 + πDA
(−1
ρ (33)
RDDB =
(
(1− γ)
1 + πDDH
+ γµ
1− bθDDA
1 + bπDD
)−1
ρ. (34)
where inflation rates are determined according to (24) in states with full
default (i.e. state L in the D and DD equilibria); according to (26) in states
with partial default (namely state A in the DD equilibrium), and according
to (22) in (all other) states with no default.
For expositional convenience, we will present and discuss our main results
in three steps, by stating one lemma and two propositions.
4.3 Uniqueness of inflation
The following lemma establishes that, under our assumptions, the equilib-
rium inflation rate is uniquely determined, for any equilibrium level of the
nominal interest rate RjB.
Lemma 2 With convex costs of inflation and the normalization C 0 (0) = 0,
the optimal reaction function for inflation under default, (22) or (24), and
under no default (26), yields unique equilibrium rates πi,πˆ, eπi, for given
agents expectations and haircuts θji , embedded in the equilibrium market in-
terest rate RjB, j = ND,D,DD.
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Consider the reaction function under no default, (26), rewritten here for
convenience:
C0 (πi) = z0( R
j
B
1 + πi
B +G− πi
1 + πi
κ)
BRjB + κ
(1 + πi)
2 ,
where the expressions for RjB are given by (32) through (34). Under con-
vexity of inflation costs C 0(·), the left-hand-side is increasing in inflation.
Therefore, inflation is uniquely determined if the right-hand-side–the mar-
ginal benefit of inflation evaluated in equilibrium– is decreasing in πi. It
is easy to see that this is always the case in an equilibrium with no default
where RNDB = R, since R/ (1 + πi) is decreasing in πi. In turn, this es-
tablishes that the inflation level is unique in states of the world in which
there is no default across all equilibria (including D and DD). A similar
argument applies to the cases of full default,15 and to the case of interior
default. In the latter case (relevant under our assumptions only in the DD
equilibrium), we can rewrite the expression (22) as follows:
C0
-bπDD. = α
1− α
0B@ κ-
1 + bπDD.2 +
RDDB B-
1 + bπDD.2
1CA .
where the first and the second term in brackets on the right hand side are
decreasing in bπDD.16
A unique inflation rate conditional on a realized haircut rate rules out
the possibility of self-fulfilling hikes in interest rates driven by anticipation
of debt debasement via inflation–the policy scenario analyzed by Calvo
1988 under the restriction that the costs of inflation are bounded. When
these costs are convex, as we assume in our model, multiplicity (if any)
only obtains in outright repudiation rates. Convexity of inflation costs
15 In the case of full default, the term on the right-hand side of (23), capturing the e§ects
of changes in inflation rates on tax distortions, will be again decreasing in πi. Moreover, it
is clear from RDB and R
DD
B that the level of inflation in the state of full default, L, does not
a§ect the nominal sovereign rate. Therefore, in state L inflation is uniquely determined
under both the D and DD equilibrium.
16 It is clear that since 0 < bθDDA ≤ 1,
ρ
(1−γ)
1+πDD
H
"
1 + bπDD#2 ≥ RDDB /
$
1 + bπDD%2 ,
but the term on the left hand side is obviously decreasing in bπDD.
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could actually be relaxed somewhat, without a§ecting uniqueness of infla-
tion rates. It would be enough to assume that, for some su¢ciently large
_
π
-
e.g.
_
π > bπDD., C 0(·) falls at a lower rate than the left-hand side (e.g., as
approximated by (1 + πi)
−1).17
This result o§ers a new perspective on the key lesson from Calvo (1988).
Namely, if, in the policymakers’ preferences, the cost of inflation does not
rise su¢ciently fast, belief-driven sovereign debt crises may be rooted in
the behavior of the monetary authorities, rather than the fiscal authorities.
In other words, they may occur independently of expectations of outright
default. It follows that a su¢ciently strong aversion to inflation is a key pre-
condition for the central bank to be e§ective in ruling out non-fundamental
equilibria. Contrary to popular arguments in the press, a low social costs
of inflation provides no firm foundations for the central bank to act as a
“lender of last resort” to the government.
4.4 Multiple equilibria for intermediate levels of sovereign
debt
We are now ready to characterize the multiplicity of equilibria in the sov-
ereign rate and haircuts over some ranges for the government financing
needs, as depicted in Figure 1. For clarity of exposition, we articulate our
main result in two propositions. The first establishes that there exists a
range of B for which both the ND and the D equilibrium are possible. The
second shows that there is another, non overlapping, debt range for which
the ND equilibrium no longer exists, but both the D and the DD equilib-
rium are possible. Under the maintained Assumption 2, these equilibria are
all well-behaved (Walrasian-stable) in the sense defined above. We will show
that inflation and seigniorage do a§ect the equilibrium policy trade-o§s and
the debt range over which multiplicity obtains–but the option to inflate
debt away does not rule out the possibility of self-fulfilling non-fundamental
sovereign crises.
4.4.1 Multiplicity between the ND and the D equilibrium
To state our first proposition, we define two thresholds for B. The first
threshold, denoted by BL, is defined as the minimum level of B at which, if
17This condition may not be satisfied by some specifications of C(·), for instance, if C(·)
is bounded for large but finite values of the inflation rate (see e.g. Calvo 1988). Even in
this case, however, it would be possible to obtain a unique equilibrium by assuming that
seigniorage is not increasing in inflation, but instead obeys a La§er curve.
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markets coordinate their expectations on anticipating a 100% haircut in the
low output state (and thus charge a destabilizing high market rate RDB > R),
ex post the government will validate their expectations and default in the
low output state. This threshold is obtained from the counterpart of (16),
written as an equality and evaluated at the sovereign rate RDB :
Φ+ α
RDBBL
1 + eπDL + z
 
G+ α
RDBBL
1 + eπDL − eπ
D
L
1 + eπDL κ
!
+ C
-eπDL. (35)
= z
!
G+
RDBBL
1 + πDL
− π
D
L
1 + πDL
κ
"
+ C %πDL & .
The second threshold, denoted by BL, is defined as the maximum level
of B at which, if markets expect no default and thus charge the risk free
rate R, the government will be indi§erent between default and no default in
any state of the world. The threshold BL is also obtained from (16), again
written as an equality but now evaluated at the sovereign rate RNDB = R:
Φ+ α
RBL
1 + eπNDL + z
 
G+ α
RBL
1 + eπNDL − eπ
ND
L
1 + eπNDL κ
!
+ C
-eπNDL . (36)
= z
!
G+
RBL
1 + πNDL
− π
ND
L
1 + πNDL
κ
"
+ C %πNDL & .
Note that, when debt is above the threshold BL, the government would
default in the weak fundamental state even if markets charged the risk free
rate R. For B ≥ BL, then, ND cannot be an equilibrium.
Multiplicity arises if BL > BL. For B comprised between the two thresh-
olds, a fundamental equilibrium with no default coexists with another, non-
fundamental equilibrium with sovereign risk.
Proposition 3 Holding assumptions (28) through (29), for 0 < B < BL,
where BL is defined by (36), there is one well-behaved rational expectations
equilibrium with no default which satisfies the budget constraint (5), the op-
timal tax plan (25), the optimal inflation plan (26) and the pricing condition
(8) with RNDB = R. For B ≥ BL where BL is defined by (35), there is a
second well-behaved rational expectations equilibrium where the government
borrows at the rate RDB and defaults in the L state only, in which it follows
optimal plans (23) and (24). These two equilibria will coexist if BL < BL,
for B in the range BL ≤ B < BL. A su¢cient condition for multiplicity is
that κ! 0.
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Under the su¢cient condition κ ! 0 (i.e., seigniorage revenue is negli-
gible), the proof of the proposition is straightforward and particularly in-
structive in the special case in which all government debt is real (inflation-
indexed), so that inflation is always zero in equilibrium and by (30) bTL−G =
0. This is the case of a non-monetary economy (or a monetary economy
where the costs of inflation are arbitrarily high). To show that BL < BL,
we combine the equations determining BL and BL imposing πi = 0, so to
obtain the following expression:
Φ = z
%
G+ ρBL
&− z %G+ αρBL&− αρBL (37)
= z
!
G+
ρ
(1− γ) + γµBL
"
− z
!
G+
αρ
(1− γ) + γµBL
"
− αρ
(1− γ) + γµBL,
where RDB =
ρ
(1−γ)+γµ > R = ρ. The expressions on the first and the second
line are both increasing in debt B: this follows from the fact that whenbTL − G = 0, taxes and distortions under no default and full default are
always larger than under partial default – see (19). Since the sovereign
(real) rate is higher when agents anticipate default, then, if evaluated at the
same level of B, the expression on the second line would be bigger than the
expression one on the first line: it must be that BL > BL. As (32) and (33)
evaluated at zero inflation are constant, it is apparent that the D and the
ND equilibria (both admissible for B within the two thresholds) are well-
behaved: the ex-ante interest rate payments RjBB are always increasing in
B for j = ND,D.
Similarly to Lorenzoni and Werning (2014), this argument establishes
that, in an economy with real (indexed) debt and no seigniorage revenues,
there is always the possibility of multiple well-behaved equilibria in default
rates. For α ! 0 (as, e.g., in Lorenzoni and Werning (2014)), one can
easily show that the range of multiplicity
)
BL, BL
*
has size γ (1− µ)BL,
where γ (1− µ) is (approximately) the spread between RDB and R. This
suggests that the range
)
BL, BL
*
will generally be larger, the larger the
spread between RDB and R, and the higher BL.
A similar argument applies to the case of nominal debt, whereas we know
that a discretionary government will choose positive inflation even if κ = 0.
The expression combining the two thresholds BL and BL becomes:
Φ = z
!
G+
R
1 + πNDL
BL
"
− z
!
G+ α
R
1 + eπNDL
"
− α R
1 + eπNDL BL + C
%
πNDL
&− C -eπNDL .
= z
!
G+
RDB
1 + πDL
BL
"
− z
!
G+ α
RDB
1 + eπDL BL
"
− α R
D
B
1 + eπDL BL + C
%
πDL
&− C -eπDL.
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Also in this case, it is easy to see that the expressions on the first and second
line are increasing in the level of debt (since (19) holds and costs of inflation
are convex) and, in state L, the ex-post sovereign interest rate is higher
under expected default than under no default, namely:
(1− γ) 1 + π
ND
L
1 + πNDH
+ γ
!
µ
1 + πNDL
1 + πNDA
+ 1− µ
"
> (1− γ) 1 + π
D
L
1 + πDH
+ γµ
1 + πDL
1 + πDH
.
Hence, BL > BL: multiple equilibria exist also when debt is not indexed.
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Again, these equilibria are well behaved, since inflation is increasing in B,
implying that both R and RDB are also increasing in B.
Positive seigniorage κ > 0 will make the proof analytically cumbersome,
but will not overturn its logic. Multiplicity will obtain as long as the elas-
ticity of seigniorage to inflation is not exceedingly large.
4.4.2 Multiplicity between the D and the DD equilibrium
In the range of B with multiplicity identified in the first proposition, sov-
ereign debt is risk free in the fundamental equilibrium, but may become risky
in a non-fundamental equilibrium when agents expect the government to de-
fault conditional on macroeconomic distress, in the weak state of the world.
We now characterize a second range of debt over which default occurs for
fundamental reasons. Namely, debt is never risk-free, since the government
will always repudiate debt in the weak state of the world, which materializes
with a positive probability. Driven by self-fulfilling expectations, however,
there is a second equilibrium in which the government defaults, either par-
tially or fully, also under stronger economic conditions.
Analogously to BL and BL, we define two further thresholds for B
(BA and BA), relevant for levels of debt above BL. For values of debt
BL ≤ B < BA, our model economy admits one (fundamental) equilibrium
with full default in state L, whereas markets charge the interest rate RDB .
For debt B ≥ BA > BL a second (non-fundamental) equilibrium emerges,
DD, in which markets coordinate their expectations on anticipating a 100
18Recall that inflation rates will be determined as follows
z0(
ρ
(1− γ) 1+πNDL
1+πND
H
+ γ
$
µ
1+πND
L
1+πND
A
+ 1− µ
%B+G) ρ
(1− γ) 1+πNDL
1+πND
H
+ γ
$
µ
1+πND
L
1+πND
A
+ 1− µ
%B = C0 $NDL %$1+NDL %
z0(
ρ
(1− γ) 1+πDL
1+πD
H
+ γµ
1+πD
L
1+πD
A
B +G)
ρ
(1− γ) 1+πDL
1+πD
H
+ γµ
1+πD
L
1+πD
A
B = C0
$
πDL
%$
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%
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percent haircut in the low output state and partial default in state A, and
thus charge a destabilizing high market rate RDDB > R
D
B . Ex post, the gov-
ernment defaults in both states, validating these expectations. When debt is
above the threshold BA, however, default in the intermediate state becomes
inevitable, and the D equilibrium no longer exists. Therefore, multiplicity
arises when BA > BA.
To save on space, we omit a formal statement of a proposition, but
directly write out the condition for multiplicity, implying BA > BA:"
(1− γ) 1 + bπD
1 + πDH
+ γµ
1 + bπD
1 + πDA
#"-
TˆA −G
.
+
bπD
1 + bπD κ
#
> (38)"
(1− γ) 1 + bπDD
1 + πDDH
+
%
1− θDDA
&
γµ
#"-
TˆA −G
.
+
bπDD
1 + bπDD κ
#
This condition is easy to verify in the same special cases analyzed in rela-
tion to the first multiplicity range. When seigniorage revenue is nil (κ = 0)
and debt is inflation-indexed (or inflation costs are arbitrarily high) so that
inflation is zero, the above condition becomes
[(1− γ) + γµ]
-
TˆA −G
.
>
)
(1− γ) + %1− θDDA & γµ* -TˆA −G. > ρBL.
(39)
This first inequality is always satisfied because θDDA (solving (27) in state
A) is strictly positive, i.e., θDDA > 0. The second inequality follows from
Assumption 1. Observe that, with zero inflation, the size of the debt range)
BA, BA
*
over which multiplicity occurs is γµθDDA
-
TˆA −G
.
. As above, this
range is proportional to the (minimum) spread between the non-fundamental
and the fundamental value of the sovereign rate, RDDB and R
D
B , approxi-
mately equal to the term γµθDDA . With an endogenous haircut rate, the
second term is (the present discounted value of) the post-default primary
surplus in state A,
-
TˆA −G
.
.
When debt is nominal and thus inflation is positive, the multiplicity
condition (with κ! 0) boils down to:
(1− γ)
 
1 + bπD
1 + πDH
− 1 + bπDD
1 + πDDH
!
+ γµ
 
1 + bπD
1 + πDA
− %1− θDDA &
!
> 0, (40)
where inflation rates are determined by (22) and (26) evaluated at RDB and
RDDB . The above expression is approximately equal to the (ex-post) real
spread between the non-fundamental and the fundamental sovereign rate,
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RDDB
1+bπDD − RDB1+bπD . In other words, a positive spread implies multiplicity–a
su¢cient conditions being 1+bπD
1+πDH
≥ 1+bπDD
1+πDDH
and 1+bπD
1+πDA
>
%
1− θDDA
&
, for θDDA >
0. By way of example, (40) is satisfied when θDDA ! 1 and inflation rates
across equilibria in state H are such that 1+π
DD
H
1+πDH
≥ 1+bπDD
1+bπD (e.g., because the
function z(·, YH) would be relatively steep).
Relative to an economy with indexed bonds, the option to reduce the
real value of debt via inflation may/may not increase the resilience of the
economy to multiplicity. Holding seigniorage constant at zero (or more gen-
erally, holding it constant independently of inflation), the economy may be
more or less resilient depending on whether
(1− γ)
 
1 + bπD
1 + πDH
− 1 + bπDD
1 + πDDH
!
+ γµ
 
1 + bπD
1 + πDA
− 1
!
7 0.
Observe that resilience is helped by a uniformly low level of inflation in
state H–which would tend to turn the term
-
1+bπD
1+πDH
− 1+bπDD
1+πDDH
.
negative–
together with a high probability of the no-default state H, 1−γ. Intuitively,
the lower the anticipated inflation in the non-default stateH, and the higher
the probability attached to such a state, the lower the interest rate charged
by investors in period 1. A contained debt service in turn enhances the e§ects
of discretionary inflation in the L and A states. Relative to this case, when
seigniorage is increasing in inflation (as we assume in our model), inflation
revenue will be higher in the DD equilibrium (since inflation increases with
the nominal interest rate). Seigniorage will tend to raise BA and thus, other
things equal (see (38)), reduce the multiplicity range.
Finally, it is easy to verify that, under Assumption 2, the ex-ante interest
rate bill RDDB B in nominal terms will be rising in the initial level of nominal
liabilities B, ensuring that the also the DD equilibrium is well-behaved.
Namely, in the non-fundamental DD equilibrium:
BRDDB =
(1− α)Bρ− γµ
h-
TˆA −G
.
+ πˆ
DD
1+πˆDD
κ
i
(1−γ)(1−α)
1+πDDH
− αγµ
1+πˆDD
.
Provided κ is not exceedingly large, 1 − γ > α and 1+πˆDD
1+πDDH
> µ > 0 will
ensure that RDDB B be increasing in B.
To conclude this section, we illustrate the numerical example underlying
Figure 1. To draw this figure, we impose Assumptions 1 and 2, but relax
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Assumption 3 (motivated only by analytical convenience). To draw the
figure, we set the primary surpluses in the L and A states to TˆL − G =
0.30, TˆA − G =0.52, (where G = 0 without loss of generality), and the
maximum value of seigniorage equal to κ = 0.50. Note that, given the two
period structure of our model, these figures are to be interpreted in terms of
present discounted values. Normalizing expected output to 1, hence, they
can be read as, respectively, 30, 52 and 50 percent of expected GDP–by
the same token, B = 1 in the figure would correspond to 100 percent of
expected GDP. As long as endogenous inflation is always close to zero in the
H state, outcomes in this state are practically irrelevant for the equilibria
we study. We then set TˆH −G =2.22 (in line with the last inequality on the
right in Assumption 1) and the probabilities such that µ = 1/2 and γ = 0.2
(in line with Assumption 2). The sovereign rate spread over the risk free
rate is then around 10 percent in the D equilibrium, and 20 percent in the
DD equilibrium. The fixed and variable costs of default are, respectively,
Φ = 0.1 (equal to 10 percent of expected GDP) and α = 0.1 (equal to 10
percent of GDP if total debt service is as high as GDP). The cost of inflation
is assumed to be quadratic and equal to C (π) = 1.125 ·π2. This implies that
an inflation rate of 10 percent (π = 0.1) causes output costs (in present
discounted) equal to 1.1 percent of expected GDP. Similarly, tax distortions
are set to z (·;Yi) =  i ·T 2i , where 2 · i · Tˆi = α/ (1− α) . By way of example,
this implies that in state A  A = 0.11 and, in present discounted value, the
output cost of a primary surplus of 50 percent of expected GDP is around 2.5
percent of expected GDP. From this parameterization, we obtain minimum
haircut rates around 75 percent in the L and the A state (precisely, θL =
0.7904 and θA =0.7230). As shown in the figure, equilibrium multiplicity is
possible for B in the following ranges [1.07,1.15], and [1.39,1.49].
5 Ruling out bad equilibria with a credible mon-
etary backstop
When multiple equilibria are possible, social welfare is lower when markets
coordinate on the equilibrium with default in more states of the world. A
high interest bill driven by self-fulfilling expectations of default causes un-
warranted output and budget costs–associated to non-fundamental default
when this occurs, but also with the need to raise distortionary primary sur-
pluses in states of the world where the government opts for servicing the
debt in full.
The fact that equilibria with non-fundamental default are detrimental
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to social welfare motivates the search for e§ective backstop policies. In this
section we analyze the workings of monetary backstops, whereby the central
bank announces that it will stand ready to purchase an amount of public
debt !B if agents coordinate on a non-fundamental default. As it is cus-
tomary in the literature, we posit that market coordination across equilibria
is regulated by a device akin to a “tra¢c signal” that switches between
red and green: when red appears, agents coordinate their expectations on
the non-fundamental equilibrium, provided this equilibrium exists (see e.g.
Evans, Honkapohja and Romer (1998)). If the central bank backstop policy
is successful, however, the very announcement of debt purchases rules out
the non-fundamental interest rate as an equilibrium outcome, and markets
expectations cannot but coordinate on the unique, fundamental, equilib-
rium.
Debt purchases do not need to be actually carried out but, to have
the desired e§ect, the policy has to be credible. Namely, it has to satisfy
the requirement that, if debt purchases were to be e§ectively carried out,
the ensuing outcome would be feasible, unique, and welfare-improving. So,
even if balance sheet losses and/or the possibility of elevated inflation as
a consequence of central bank purchases of debt are merely o§-equilibrium
outcomes, their assessment is crucial to the design of a backstop policy.
Should central bank interventions result in expected welfare losses relative
to a non-fundamental equilibrium, the announcement of a backstop would
clearly not be credible, hence would not work.
As discussed in Section 3, backstop can be implemented under di§erent
regimes of fiscal and monetary interactions. We find it analytically conve-
nient to study the backstop under the two polar assumptions of either a
consolidated or a separate budget constraint, whereby the transfers by the
central bank to the fiscal authorities are restricted to be non-negative. In
each case, we organize our analysis focusing separately on each of the two
multiplicity regions established in the previous section, as these allow us to
discuss di§erent issues. In the first region for B, the ND equilibrium is
fundamental, the D equilibrium is the welfare-dominated, non-fundamental
one, where, by assumption 3, default is complete. In the second region, the
D equilibrium is fundamental. In the DD equilibrium (now the welfare-
dominated, non-fundamental one), default in the A state is interior, and the
optimal haircut rate generally responds to monetary policy.
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5.1 Budget consolidation (fiscal backing)
When the constraint on the central bank budget is not binding, default
on its holding of debt automatically generates an equivalent increase in
tax liabilities–the transfer to the fiscal authority falls and may become
negative. E§ectively, central bank purchases of debt reduce the ‘tax base’
(the outstanding stock of debt held by private investors) on which the fiscal
authority can impose haircuts and produce net budget saving. As a result,
interventions raise taxation conditional on debt repudiation and, taxation
and inflation comove together, exacerbate the overall output costs of default.
We have seen that debt purchases reduce the overall debt service, hence
the size and costs of primary surpluses the government needs to generate
under no default. Hence, by raising tax distortions under default, while
facilitating the full service of debt at lower costs, central bank interven-
tions unambiguously make the resort to haircuts less attractive for the fiscal
policymaker.
Consider debt levels in the multiplicity range, BL ≤ B < BL, where the
two thresholds satisfy the condition for full default in state L conditional on
! = 0. Holding these thresholds constant, the condition for optimal (non
fundamental) default in state L given the amount of purchases !B is:
Φ ≤ z %TDL &− z -eTDL .+ C %πDL &− C -eπDL.− α RDB
1 + eπDL (1− !)B (41)
where
eTDL = G− eπDL
1 + eπDL κ+ α R
D
B
1 + eπDL (1− !)B + ρ(1− γ) 1+eπDL
1+πDH
+ γµ
1+eπDL
1+πDA
+ γ (1− µ)
!B
TDL = G−
πDL
1 + πDL
κ+
RDB
1 + eπDL (1− !)B + ρ(1− γ) 1+πDL
1+πDH
+ γµ
1+πDL
1+πDH
+ γ (1− µ) 1+πDL
1+eπDL
!B
and inflation rates under central bank interventions are determined by the
counterparts of (12) in Section 3. Since, as discussed above, z
-eTDL . is
increasing in !, it is apparent that a higher amount of debt purchases reduces
the expression on the right hand side of the inequality (41). Given Φ, a
su¢ciently large amount of interventions can overturn the fiscal authority
decision to default.
The e§ect of a backstop is most clearly seen in the limiting case in which
government debt and central bank reserves are both indexed to inflation,
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and there is no seigniorage. The condition (41) simplifies to:
Φ ≤ z
!
G+
!
1
(1− γ) + γµ (1− !) + !
"
ρB
"
+
−z
!
G+
!
α
(1− γ) + γµ (1− !) + !
"
ρB
"
− α
(1− γ) + γµ (1− !) ρB.
The function on the right-hand side of the equation is decreasing in !, for
any 0 ≤ ! < 1, since under full default the marginal tax distortions must be
larger than α/ (1− α) . Moreover, when ! = 1, the right-hand side is equal
to zero. Thus, for any level of debt BL ≤ B < BL there is always a level
of purchases 0 < !L (B) − " < 1 for which the equation is satisfied with
equality, with " arbitrarily small, implying that default in state L cannot
be optimal for central bank purchases !L (B). At this level of intervention,
the equilibrium D with non-fundamental default in state L does not exist
anymore.
The following proposition states the result for the case with nominal
bonds and positive seigniorage.
Proposition 4 Assume that there is a range of debt BL ≤ B < BL, where
BL and BL are defined in (35) and (36), respectively, for which both equi-
libria ND and D exist. Then there exists a minimum level of announced
purchases, 1 > !L (B) > 0, for which the only equilibrium is ND. In this
equilibrium, conditional on a level of purchases !L (B) , welfare is higher
than in the D equilibrium without purchases.
In the second multiplicity region BA ≤ B < BA,matters are complicated
by the fact that the haircut rate in state A is endogenous when default
is interior. As interventions reduce the stock of liabilities held by private
investors, the government may optimally decide to raise the haircut rate. In
the case of indexed liabilities and no seigniorage, for instance, the equation
determining θA when ! > 0 is:
Φ = z
0@G+
-
TˆA −G
.
− (1− α) θAρ!B
1− (1− α) θA
1A+
−z
-
TˆA
.
− αθA
-
TˆA −G
.
− ρ!B
1− (1− α) θA
.
It is apparent that a higher ! decreases the expression on the right hand
side of the equality (since z0 (·) > α/ (1− α)). Therefore, θA will have to
also rise in order for the expression to hold with equality.
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Yet, as shown in Section 3, a higher ! will result in an overall lower debt
service and thus in lower inflation and taxation across all states. So, while
unambiguously raising θA up to its upper limit, interventions have opposing
e§ects on the lower default threshold BA, which, for ! > 0, is determined
by the following expression:
BA =
h
(1− γ) 1+πˆDD
1+πDDH
+ (1− θA) γµ
i h-
TˆA −G
.
+ πˆ
DD
1+πˆDD
κ
i
/ρ
(1− !) [1− (1− α) θA] + !
(1− γ) 1+πˆDD
1+πDDH
+ (1− θA) γµ
(1− γ) 1+πˆDD
1+πDDH
+ γµ+ γ (1− µ) 1+πˆDD
1+eπDDL
.
Even keeping inflation constant, it is clear that that, for a given θA, in-
creasing ! may either increase or decrease such threshold. To wit: with
no seigniorage and indexed debt, ! in the denominator is multiplied by
[(1− α) θA − γ (1− (1− θA)µ)]. This expression is negative for θA ! 0
and positive for θA ! 1, hence the debt threshold BA will be initially in-
creasing, then will become decreasing, as the central bank picks higher !0s,
until θA = 1. At this point, however, the same logic we used to study the
lower multiplicity region (with full default in state L) will also apply to
the higher multiplicity region (when default in state A is complete). Once
θA = 1, higher purchases unambiguously raise the debt threshold for multi-
ple equilibria.
On a su¢cient scale, purchases of government debt by the central bank
are bound to result in an unique equilibrium also in the second region of
multiplicity. Relative to the non-fundamental equilibrium, the economy is
better o§ both in the D-equilibrium, and on the o§-equilibrium path, i.e.
conditional on debt purchases e§ectively implemented in the first period.
This is because, on the o§-equilibrium path, the reduction in the burden of
debt service would mean that the economy does not incur the suboptimal
costs of default in state A, and inflation and taxes are lower in all states of
the world.19
Figure 2a,b illustrate these results using our numerical example–hence
in reference to the two regions of multiplicity shown Figure 1. The upper
panel of the figure plots the minimum level of interventions required to elim-
inate multiplicity. The lower panel reports (ex ante) welfare conditional on
19One slight complication to keep in mind is that large debt purchases may increase
the threshold for fundamental default in state L–so that conditional on central bank
interventions the equilibrium may feature no default in any state. But to the extent that
the two multiplicity regions are further from each other (as they are in our specification),
there will be some level of interventions that will rule out non-fundamental default in state
A without ruling out fundamental default in state L.
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no intervention (! = 0) and conditional on the minimum-level interventions
shown in the panel above. Two features of the numerical example stands out.
First, multiplicity over the relevant range disappears for values of ! between
1/4 and 1/2. Second, welfare conditional on actual (minimum) interventions
is always higher than welfare in a non-fundamental equilibrium–confirming
that the minimum-intervention backstop is feasible and welfare-improving
as o§-equilibrium outcome.
5.2 Budget separation
Under budget separation, central bank purchases of debt no longer reduce
the ‘tax base’ for a default, but raise the possibility of high ine¢cient
inflation. We have seen above that a monetary backstop rules out non-
fundamental equilibria, without necessarily ruling out fundamental default–
this is the case when debt falls in the upper multiplicity region. Thus, un-
der budget separation, if only o§-equilibrium, debt purchases may result in
balance sheet losses–implying that the monetary authorities may have to
deviate from the optimal policy and run high inflation. The key issue is
whether this deviation impinges on the credibility of backstops.
Relative to the case of budget consolidation, high prospective inflation in
case of default reduces welfare conditional on interventions. This is because,
as monetary policy cannot pursue e¢cient inflation plans, distortions are no
longer optimally smoothed across policy instruments, and the output costs
of inflation are convex. But exactly for this reason, as long as preferences
over inflation are su¢ciently similar across policy makers, the large output
distortions from high prospective inflation also weigh on the decision to
default by the fiscal authority. Indeed, a key result of this section is that the
consequences of budget separation for the conduct of monetary policy act
as a deterrent against the choice of debt repudiation by fiscal policymakers
adverse to inflation.
Starting with the low multiplicity region, focus again on debt levels
within the two thresholds BL ≤ B < BL, defined conditional on ! = 0
in (35) and (36). The decision to default as a function of ! is determined
again by condition (41). If no default takes place, the central bank bud-
get constraint does not bind. Since taxes adjust to satisfy the consolidated
budget constraint:
TDi = G−
πDi
1 + πDi
κ+
RDB
1 + πDi
(1− !)B +
#
R
1 + πDi
$
!B,
they are decreasing in !. So does inflation, determined by the optimality
36
condition:%
1 + πDi
&2 C0 %πDi & = z0 %TDi & )κ+ (1− !)BRDB + !BR* ,
where the risk free rate is given by R = ρ
(1−γ) 1
1+πD
H
+γµ 1
1+πD
A
+γ(1−µ) 1
1+eπD
L
.
Clearly, debt purchases lower the cost of servicing the debt, as is the case
with budget consolidation.
Di§erent from the previous subsection, however, purchases now result in
lower taxes but higher inflation in case of default. For instance, under full
default θDL = 1, inflation has to increase at least to balance the central bank
budget constraint: eπDL ≥ !κRB;
while, if the central bank budget constraint is binding, taxation will be lower,
the larger ! is: eTDL = G+ α RDB
1 + eπDL (1− !)B.
Because of these opposing movements, the e§ects of debt purchases by the
central bank is in principle ambiguous. However, unless seigniorage revenue
is unrealistically high and elastic to inflation, the negative costs of inflation
are bound to prevail. Focus on the default condition (41) when the central
bank constraint binds (so that eπDL = !κRB),
Φ ≤ z %TDL &+ C %πDL &+
−z
!
G+ α
RDB
1 + !κRB
(1− !)B
"
− α R
D
B
1 + !κRB
(1− !)B − C
-!
κ
RB
.
.
From the last line of this expression, it is easy to derive the following su¢-
cient condition for the cost of default to increase in !:-
1 + eπDL.2 C0 -eπDL. ≥ h1 + z0 -eTDL .iα-1 + - κRB..BRDB .
Holding interest rates constant, the left-hand side of the expression is in-
creasing in inflation and thus in !; the right-hand side is decreasing in mar-
ginal tax distortions and thus in !. In light of the optimal choice of inflation
under full default when the central bank is unconstrained:-
1 + eπDL.2 C0 (eπσL) = h1 + z0 -eTDL .iα (1− !)BRDB+
z0
-eTDL . [κ+ !BR] ,
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it is clear that for ! ! 1 the above su¢cient condition must hold unless
seigniorage revenue is very large. This is quite intuitive, as the lower κ and
the larger!, the higher the inflation the central bank will have to gener-
ate to meet its nominal obligations at face value. With a convex function
C (.), there will be a level of purchases for which the decision to default is
overturned.
A similar argument applies to the higher multiplicity region, BA ≤ B <
BA. In this case, when the central bank is constrained, inflation and taxes
under non-fundamental default in state A are given by
πAκ =
%
R− (1− θA)RB
&
!B,
bTA −G = [1− θA (1− α)] RB1 + πA (1− !)B + [1− θA] RB1 + πA!B.
So, with a binding budget constraint, central bank purchases reduce overall
taxation and increase inflation under default. But now any inflationary
consequences of purchases (in case of default, with a binding central bank
constraint) also impinge on the minimum threshold θA:
Φ+ αθA
RBB
1 +
%
R− (1− θA)RB
&
!B
κ
+ z( bTA)+
C
!
R− (1− θA)RB
κ
!B
"
= z(T σA) + C (πσi ) .
making an analytical characterization of the e§ects of interventions quite
cumbersome.
The results for the case of budget separation are nonetheless clearly illus-
trated by Figure 3a,b, based on the same parameterization and layout of the
previous figure. The upper panel shows the minimum level of interventions
required to eliminate multiplicity. The lower panel reports ex ante welfare
conditional on no intervention (! = 0) and conditional on the successful
(minimum-level) interventions shown in the panel above.
As in Figure 2, welfare conditional on actual (minimum) interventions
is always higher than welfare in a non-fundamental equilibrium–confirming
that the minimum-intervention backstop is feasible and welfare-improving
as o§-equilibrium outcome also under budget separation. There is however
a notable di§erence relative to the previous figure: multiplicity over the
relevant range disappears for values of ! between 1/20 and 1/10, much lower
than in the case of a consolidated budget constraint. As discussed above,
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provided fiscal authorities are adverse to inflation and budget separation is
credibly in place, budget separation does not undermine at all monetary
backstops. Credibly committing the central bank to be responsible for its
own budget constraint can strengthen its ability to backstop government
debt.
5.3 Discussion
There are a number of factors and considerations that may complicate the
design of a successful backstop. We have already discussed the possibility of
multiplicity in equilibrium inflation rates–in the conclusion below we will
briefly consider the possibility of non-market interventions by the central
bank, e.g. measures a§ecting banks’ reserves. Here we focus on the issue of
“moral hazard”, i.e., whether a backstop could feed opportunistic behavior
by the fiscal authority in equilibrium, exacerbating fiscal fragility and there-
fore the likelihood of (fundamental) default.20 This is a widely-debated issue
that would require extensive analysis; here we focus on a basic consideration.
Conceptually, backstops are distinct from bailouts, in the form of con-
tingent transfers that occur ex post with positive probability. The literature
has long clarified that backstops may actually strengthen the incentives for
a government to undertake costly actions to strengthen the economic re-
silience to fiscal stress–the opposite of the “moral hazard” consequences
of a bailout (see Morris and Shin 2006, Corsetti et al. 2005, Corsetti and
Dedola 2011 and Nicolini et al. 2014 among others). This is because, with-
out a backstop, the possibility of belief-driven crises tends to reduce the
expected future benefits from these actions.
Nonetheless, a backstop does not necessarily eliminate fundamental de-
fault. With weak fundamentals creating fiscal stress, a central bank may
run the risk of being drawn into quite a di§erent policy, of ex-post debt
monetization a la Sargent and Wallace (1981), which may threaten its inde-
pendence and ability to deliver on its objectives. But it is hardly a reason for
a central bank to avoid recognizing its important function in the government
debt market.
These considerations also raise a deeper theoretical and practical issue,
concerning why central banks do not engage more systematically in the
sovereign debt market, to ensure that government debt is non-defaultable
20We have seen above that, on the o§-equilibrium path, the actual implementation of
debt purchases may a§ect the optimal default rate in the case of an interior solution. The
elasticity of θ to ! is however irrelevant in the equilibrium allocation resulting from a
successful backstop.
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under any circumstances. The public finance literature has shown that even
when the government can commit, it is optimal to ex-post a§ect the value of
public debt when the latter is not state-contingent, see, e.g., Adam and Grill
(2011). An intriguing direction of research may build on the observation that
eliminating default under any circumstances through monetary interventions
may not be e¢cient.
6 Conclusions
This paper has reconsidered the question of whether and how a central bank
can backstop debt issued by the fiscal authority, as to rule out self-fulfilling
sovereign debt crises. Our main conclusions resonate with the widespread
policy view that under appropriate conditions, a central bank has indeed the
power to backstop the government debt, although for di§erent reasons that
many observers invoke. Our model highlights crucial conditions. Firstly, a
monetary backstop rests on the ability of the central bank to issue liabilities
at a lower interest rate than a government subject to default risk. In our
analysis, successful intervention strategies translate into a swap of (default-)
risky government debt with nominal liabilities which can always be redeemed
against currency. Secondly, policymakers should be su¢ciently adverse to
inflation, so that monetary policy is not itself a source of multiple equilibria
in inflation and interest rates. Namely, conditional on a realized haircut,
inflation rates should be uniquely determined, ruling out the possibility of
high interest rates and taxation in the presence of sound fiscal fundamentals
and no default.
Our results are at odds with views often voiced in the public debate,
claiming that the central bank can freely play the role of lender of last resort
to the government’ because it is subject to either a soft or to no budget
constraint. These views stress, alternatively, that a central bank can always
consolidate its liabilities and force private banks to hold them indefinitely,
or debase them by a bout of unexpected inflation. In light of our analysis,
both views have fundamental weaknesses. The latter view stressing the need
for the central bank to impose financial repression over private banks by
forcing them to hold reserves, de facto introduces the possibility of default
on monetary liabilities, without however working out its consequences. If
the central bank is expected to tamper with its liabilities, it is easy to see
that the arbitrage condition relating the rate on monetary liabilities and
the risk free rate would have to include terms in the anticipated central
bank’s haircut θCBi : the optimal monetary policy would have to account for
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the optimal haircut on the holders of reserves. The logic of self-fulfilling
beliefs would then apply to a discretionary central bank as well as to the
government.
The alternative, inflationary-debasement view downplays the social costs
of running high inflation, historically conducive to financial and macro in-
stability. If anything, in line with Calvo (1988), our analysis suggests that
downplaying the costs of inflation may actually raise the prospects of self-
fulfilling sovereign debt crises driven by expectations of debt debasement,
rather than outright default. Our analysis calls attention on the non-trivial
fact that, exactly because high inflation is costly, a monetary backstop is
credible even under budget separation. Most importantly, inflation rates
are higher in an equilibrium with belief-driven outright defaults: an e§ec-
tive monetary backstop prevents high (let alone runaway) inflation, rather
than creating price instability.
An important conclusion from our analysis is that a common objective
function among fiscal and monetary authorities (or enough aversion to in-
flation costs by the fiscal authority) greatly facilitates the implementation
of a monetary backstop. As each authority internalizes the e§ects of own
policy choices on overall distortions, a monetary backstop is e§ective under
reasonably mild conditions, even when the central bank is held responsible
for its own balance sheet losses, barring contingent fiscal transfers under any
circumstance. It follows that the conditions for a monetary backstop to be
credible may be stricter when political economy or distributional consider-
ations cause the two authorities to trade-o§ self-interested objectives with
socially e¢cient policies.
Although we have developed our model from the perspective of a na-
tional economy with an independent currency, our analysis bears lessons
for a currency union. In a monetary union among essentially indepen-
dent states, national governments may pursue conflicting, inward-looking
objectives and/or be adverse to extending large-scale fiscal backing to the
common central bank. In case of budget separation, the inflationary con-
sequences from budget losses due to default by one country may be quite
contained and, most importantly, di§use through the entire currency union.
This means that a national fiscal authority choosing to default may not face
the full inflationary costs of its decision. Even under these circumstances,
however, a common central bank can still engineer a successful backstop to
member states, to the extent that, as is the case for the OMTs in the euro
area, governments have access to the benefit of a backstop only provided
they agree to strict conditionality, ensuring stability of public finances and
possibly eliciting stricter cross-border cooperation.
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Figure 1
Interest costs of issuing public debt
as a function of the initial financing need of the government
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Figure 2a
Minimum Interventions required to eliminate the non fundamental equilibrium
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Welfare with no backstop and with a minimum-intervention backstop
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Figure 3a
Minimum Interventions required to eliminate the non fundamental equilibrium
Case of budget separation with a binding central bank constraint
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Welfare with no backstop and with a minimum-intervention backstop
Case of budget separation with a binding central bank constraint
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